## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

USNLRSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AWACS, NATO, CENTO, IR, TU

SUBJECT: NATO AWACS: FURTHER TURKISH QUERIES

REFS

A) ANKARA 2934 (DTG 171055Z APR 78);

B) STATE 090645 (DTG 080126Z APR 78);

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C) ANKARA 2363 (DTG 301045Z MAR 78);D) USNATO 4204 (DTG 051719 APR 78)

1. IN PARA 2 FOLLOWING ARE OUR RESPONSES TO FURTHER TURKISH QUERIES ON NATO AWACS POSED BY GOT OFFICIAL GUR IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF ON 13 APRIL. WE ARE PLEASED AT THIS EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS TURKISH INTEREST IN THE

SUBJECT, AND TRUST IT INDICATES TURKS WILL BE WILLING TO MAKE A PROGRAM COMMITMENT AT THE MAY DPC. IN CONVEYING FOLLOWING TO GOT, EMBASSY MAY WISH TO SUGGEST THAT USAF WOULD BE PLEASED TO HOST A VISIT BY TURKISH MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WILL HAVE DIRECT OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE NATO AWACS PROGRAM FOR DISCUSSIONS OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS. THIS MIGHT BE A VERY USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO THIS ON-GOING EXCHANGE OF Q'S AND A'S THROUGH THE EMBASSY.

## 2. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS KEYED TO PARA 2 REF A:

A. WE INTENDED TO RESPOND TO TURKISH CONCERN ABOUT FORCE SIZE FLANK COVERAGE IN OUR ANSWER IN PARA 4(A) REF B. THE PRINCIPAL POINT WE WISH TO MAKE IS THAT WE ANTICIPATE A NATO AWACS FORCE COMPONENT OF 18, NOT 16, AIRCRAFT. OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH BOTH ITALIAN AND FRENCH REPRESENTATIVES, WHILE NOT PROVIDING CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THESE COUNTRIES WILL MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE POSSIBLE AN 18-PLANE FORCE, HAVE NEVERTHELESS BEEN MOST ENCOURAGING. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION OF THE NATO AWACS FORCE BY US NATIONAL AWACS IN TIMES OF TENSION/CRISIS. WE INTEND THAT THE US NATIONAL AWACS FORCE WILL BE FULLY INTEROPERABLE WITH THE NATO FORCE. NO DECISIONS HAVE, HOWEVER, YET BEEN MADE ON THE OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF US NATIONAL AWACS TO EUROPE, WHETHER SECRET

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FOR PEACETIME TRAINING OR CRISIS AUGMENTATION. WE CAN ONLY SAY AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT IN PERIODS OF TENSION OR CRISIS ALLOCATION OF AWACS WILL BE A FUNCTION OF BOTH THE NATO AND US EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING THREAT AND COMPETING NEEDS

B. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT DATA GENERATED BY NATO AWACS WILL BE EQUALLY AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTICIPATING NATIONS. THE ACCESS POINT FOR AWACS DATA WILL NOT NORMALLY BE AT THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE (FOB)/ FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION (FOL).BUT RATHER WILL BE THOSE ACE AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT SITES WITHIN THE COMMUNICATIONS ENVELOPE OF THE AIRBORNE AWACS USING JTIDS OR, IN THE INTERIM, UHF/HF TADIL A (LINK 11). DIRECT DATA LINKS BETWEEN AIRBORNE SYSTEMS (E.G., OTHER AWACS, E-2C, NIMROD) CAN FURTHER EXPAND THE AREA FROM WHICH DATA CAN BE DEVELOPED AND DOWNLINKED INTO THE ACE AIR DEFENSE GROUND ENVIRONMENT. FURTHER, CROSS-TELL CAPABILITY EXISTS AMONG VARIOUS NATO SYSTEMS. FINALLY, AS REF D POINTS OUT, LANGUAGE IS BEING INCORPORATED IN THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL (PO/78/18) SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO ENSURE UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO

AIR SPACE, LANDING RIGHTS, AND AWACS DATA FOR THE ALLIANCE AND EACH MEMBER THEREOF. YOU CAN ASSURE THE TURKS THAT IF GREEKS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO COMPLICATE THIS ISSUE, THE US WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED IN THE SPIRIT AND TO THE LETTER OF THE LANGUAGE NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN BRUSSELS (PARA 4 REF E).

C. EXISTING DATA "TIES" SHOULD ENSURE THAT TURKISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE ACCESS TO EARLY WARNING INFORMATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OTHER SOUTHERN FLANK AREAS. NADGE CROSS-TELL CAPABILITIES CAN "LINK" TURKISH AND ITALIAN NADGE SITES IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER THAT DATA WAS PASSED FROM ITALY SECRET

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TO THE FRG DURING THE 1975 EUROPEAN DEMONSTRATION. IN ADDITION, EXPANDED COVERAGE CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH USE OF RELAY TECHNIQUES BETWEEN AIRBORNE C2 SYSTEMS OR THROUGH LONG RANGE HF (LIND 11) DATA LINKS.

3. FYI. AS EMBASSY WILL RECOGNIZE, TURKISH REFERENCE TO POTENTIAL INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN NATO AWACS AND IRANIAN AWACS SURFACES FOR THE FIRST TIME AN INTERESTING AND COMPLEX ISSUE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE EMBASSY SHOULD ENCOURAGE TURKISH SPECULATION ALONG THESE LINES, BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT A RELATIONSHIP MIGHT BE WORKED OUT MUTUALLY BENE-FICIAL TO THE IRANIANS AND TO NATO. WE THINK BEST TACK TO TAKE IF -- AND ONLY IF -- TURKS ASK US OUR OPINION ABOUT THIS -- WHICH WE UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE NOT -- WOULD BE TO POINT OUT THAT THIS WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE TO DISCUSS, AND THAT IT SHOULD BE RAISED, IF AT ALL, BY THE TURKS IN BRUSSELS. THERE WOULD BE TECHNICAL AND COST OBSTACLES TO MAKING NATO AND IRANIAN AWACS INTEROPERABLE IN SO FAR AS SECURE DATA AND VOICE LINKS WOULD BE REQUIRED. BECAUSE US POLICY REGARDING CRYPTO RELEASE PROHIBITS EXPORT. THE IRANIAN SECURE LINKS WILL BE PROTECTED BY U.S. COMMERCIAL ENCRYPTION SYSTEMS WHICH WILL NOT BE INTEROPERABLE WITH STANDARD U.S. ENCRYPTION DEVICES, OR THE NATO AWACS FORCE. THESE SYSTEMS WILL HOWEVER. BE DESIGNED TO FIT STANDARD E3A INCASEMENTS AND PURCHASE OF THESE INCODERS WOULD MAKE SYSTEMS INTEROPERABLE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT INTEROPERABILITY COULD BE ACHIEVED IN A CLEAR MODE USING EXISTING VOICE OR DIGITAL DATA EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE COMMON TO ALL E3 AIRCRAFT. WHILE THIS SECRET

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MAY NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE DURING ROUTINE OPERATIONS, IT NONETHELESS EXISTS AS AN EMERGENCY CAPABILITY DURING CRISIS. END FYI.

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